(1) the United States must continue to build and maintain strong relationships with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to successfully compete with the People's Republic of China;

(2) the Australia-United States relationship will continue to be vital throughout the 21st century and beyond to compete with and deter China;

(3) as the Australia-United States alliance evolves, it is vital to ensure that emerging leaders in both countries develop a deep understanding of their ally's view of the world; and

(4) exchange programs between key legislative national security staff from Congress and Australian Parliament will further bind our nations together.

(c) ESTABLISHMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Majority Leader of the Senate, the Minority Leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, working through a designated nonprofit, such as a think tank, a foundation, or another suitable organization contracted by the Department of Defense competitive award process, shall work with the leaders of the Australian Parliament to establish the Australia-United States Legislative Exchange Program (referred to in this section as the ''Program'').

(2) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Program shall be to coordinate annual 1 to 2 week legislative exchanges between United States congressional staff and the Australian parliamentary staff that focus on national security, foreign policy, and other issues of mutual interest between the 2 countries.

(3) SELECTION OF STAFF.—

(A) CONGRESSIONAL STAFF.—In carrying out the Program, the congressional leaders referred to in paragraph (1), in consultation with the head of the nonprofit designated pursuant to paragraph (1), shall jointly select a bipartisan, bicameral group of congressional staff for each exchange described in paragraph (2).

(B) PARLIAMENTARY STAFF.—It is the sense of Congress that leaders in the Australian Parliament will select a politically balanced group of Australian parliamentary staff who will participate in each exchange described in paragraph (2).

(4) VENUES.—The exchanges described in paragraph (2) shall take place primarily in Washington, D.C. and Canberra, Australia, but may include opportunities for staff—

(A) to engage in cultural immersion activities; and

(B) to tour other key regions in each country in accordance with the purposes of the Program.

(5) PROGRAM ACTIVITIES.—Program participants, while visiting the partner country, shall—

(A) meet with senior executive and legislative branch officials, think tank scholars, and nonprofit advocacy groups; and

(B) participate in specially designed courses covering the politics and foreign policy issues in such country with the intent to foster a deeper understanding of the political environment in which their counterparts operate.

(6) CONSULTATION.—In managing the Program on behalf of the congressional leaders referred to in paragraph (1), the head of the nonprofit designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall consult with, and accepting guidance from, senior staff of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(7) ALUMNI NETWORK.—The head of the nonprofit designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall establish an alumni network program, in cooperation with a representative of the Australian Parliament, that brings together past alumni of the program for special events or programs that provide for further exchanges and lasting relationships between policymakers and leaders in both countries.

SA 4399. Mr. COTTON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title XIV, add the following:

Subtitle D—Extraction and Processing of Defense Minerals in the United States

SEC. 1431. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ''Restoring Essential Energy and Security Holdings Onshore for Rare Earths Act of 2021'' or the ''REEShore Act of 2021''.

SEC. 1432. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Natural Resources, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) DEFENSE MINERAL.—The term ''defense mineral'' has the meaning given the term ''critical mineral'' in section 7002(a) of the Energy Act of 2020 (division Z of Public Law 116–260; 30 U.S.C. 1606(a)).

(3) DEFENSE MINERAL PRODUCT.—The term ''defense mineral product'' means any product—

(A) formed or comprised of, or manufactured from, one or more defense minerals; and

(B) used in military defense technologies or other related applications.

SEC. 1433. REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE MINERAL AND DEFENSE MINERAL PRODUCTS RESERVE.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that the storage of substantial quantities of defense minerals and defense mineral products will—

(1) diminish the vulnerability of the United States to the effects of a severe supply chain interruption; and

(2) provide limited protection from the short-term consequences of an interruption in supplies of defense mineral products.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that, in procuring defense minerals and defense mineral products, the Secretary of Defense should prioritize procurement of defense minerals and defense mineral products from sources in the United States, including that are mined, produced, separated, and manufactured within the United States.

(c) REPORT REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the United States Geologic Survey, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing—

(A) the strategic requirements of the United States regarding stockpiles of defense minerals and defense mineral products; and

(B) the requirements for such metals and products to support the United States for one year in the event of a supply disruption.

(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the report required by paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Defense shall take into consideration the needs of the Armed Forces of the United States, the defense industrial and technology sectors, and any places, organizations, physical infrastructure, or digital infrastructure designated as critical to the national security of the United States.

(d) REASSESSMENT OF REQUIREMENTS.—The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Defense shall—

(1) jointly and continually reassess the strategic requirements described in paragraph (1) of subsection (c) and the considerations described in paragraph (2) of that subsection; and

(2) not less frequently than annually, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report—

(A) on that reassessment; and

(B) describing any activities relating to the establishment or use of a strategic defense minerals and defense mineral products reserve during the preceding year.

SEC. 1434. REPORT ON DISCLOSURES CONCERNING DEFENSE MINERALS BY CONTRACTORS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

Not later than December 31, 2021, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Interior, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—

(1) a disclosure, provided by a contractor to the Department of Defense, of any system with a defense mineral product that is a permanent magnet, including an identification of the country or countries in which—

(A) the defense minerals used in the magnet were mined;

(B) such defense minerals were refined into oxides;

(C) such defense minerals were made into metals and alloys; and

(D) the magnet was sintered or bonded and magnetized;

(2) if a contractor cannot make the disclosure described in paragraph (1) with respect to a magnet, an assessment of the effect of requiring the contractor to establish and implement an independently verifiable supply chain tracking system in order to provide that disclosure not later than 180 days after providing the magnet to the Department of Defense;

(3) an assessment of the extent of reliance by the United States on foreign countries, and especially countries that are not allies of the United States, for defense minerals;

(4) a determination with respect to which systems are of the greatest concern for interruptions of defense minerals supply chains; and

(5) any suggestions for legislation or funding that would mitigate supply chain security gaps.

SEC. 1435. PRODUCTION IN AND USES OF DEFENSE MINERALS BY UNITED STATES ALLIES.

(a) POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to encourage countries that are allies of the United States to eliminate their dependence on non-allied countries for defense minerals to the maximum extent practicable.

(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than December 31, 2022, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report—

(1) describing in detail the discussions of such Secretaries with countries that are allies of the United States concerning supply chain security for defense minerals;

(2) assessing the likelihood of those countries discontinuing the use of defense minerals from the People's Republic of China or other countries that such Secretaries deem to be of concern; and

(3) assessing initiatives in other countries to increase defense mineral mining and production capabilities.

SA 4400. Mr. WICKER (for himself, Mr. CARDIN, and Mr. MENENDEZ) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle G of title XII, add the following:

SEC. 1283. TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION ACCOUNTABILITY AND PREVENTION.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the ''Transnational Repression Accountability and Prevention Act of 2021'' or as the ''TRAP Act of 2021''.

(b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) works to prevent and fight crime through enhanced cooperation and innovation on police and security matters, including kleptocracy, counterterrorism, cybercrime, counternarcotics, and transnational organized crime.

(2) United States membership and participation in INTERPOL advances the national security and law enforcement interests of the United States related to combating kleptocracy, terrorism, cybercrime, narcotics, and transnational organized crime.

(3) Article 2 of INTERPOL's Constitution states that the organization aims ''[to] ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities . . . in the spirit of the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' ''.

(4) Article 3 of INTERPOL's Constitution states that ''[i]t is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character''.

(5) These principles provide INTERPOL with a foundation based on respect for human rights and avoidance of politically motivated actions by the organization and its members.

(6) According to the Justice Manual of the United States Department of Justice, ''[i]n the United States, national law prohibits the arrest of the subject of a Red Notice issued by another INTERPOL member country, based upon the notice alone''.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that some INTERPOL member countries have repeatedly misused INTERPOL's databases and processes, including Notice and Diffusion mechanisms, for activities of an overtly political or other unlawful character and in violation of international human rights standards, including making requests to harass or persecute political opponents, human rights defenders, or journalists.

(d) SUPPORT FOR INTERPOL INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS.—The Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall—

(1) use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States, as appropriate, within INTERPOL's General Assembly and Executive Committee to promote reforms aimed at improving the transparency of INTERPOL and ensuring its operation consistent with its Constitution, particularly articles 2 and 3, and Rules on the Processing of Data, including—

(A) supporting INTERPOL's reforms enhancing the screening process for Notices, Diffusions, and other INTERPOL communications to ensure they comply with INTERPOL's Constitution and Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD);

(B) supporting and strengthening INTERPOL's coordination with the Commission for Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF) in cases in which INTERPOL or the CCF has determined that a member country issued a Notice, Diffusion, or other INTERPOL communication against an individual in violation of articles 2 or 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution, or the RPD, to prohibit such member country from seeking the publication or issuance of any subsequent Notices, Diffusions, or other INTERPOL communication against the same individual based on the same set of claims or facts;

(C) increasing, to the extent practicable, dedicated funding to the CCF and the Notices and Diffusions Task Force in order to further expand operations related to the review of requests for red notices and red diffusions;

(D) supporting candidates for positions within INTERPOL's structures, including the Presidency, Executive Committee, General Secretariat, and CCF who have demonstrated experience relating to and respect for the rule of law;

(E) seeking to require INTERPOL in its annual report to provide a detailed account, disaggregated by member country or entity of—

(i) the number of Notice requests, disaggregated by color, that it received;

(ii) the number of Notice requests, disaggregated by color, that it rejected;

(iii) the category of violation identified in each instance of a rejected Notice;

(iv) the number of Diffusions that it cancelled without reference to decisions by the CCF; and

(v) the sources of all INTERPOL income during the reporting period; and

(F) supporting greater transparency by the CCF in its annual report by providing a detailed account, disaggregated by country, of—

(i) the number of admissible requests for correction or deletion of data received by the CCF regarding issued Notices, Diffusions, and other INTERPOL communications; and

(ii) the category of violation alleged in each such complaint;

(2) inform the INTERPOL General Secretariat about incidents in which member countries abuse INTERPOL communications for politically motivated or other unlawful purposes so that, as appropriate, action can be taken by INTERPOL; and

(3) request to censure member countries that repeatedly abuse and misuse INTERPOL's red notice and red diffusion mechanisms, including restricting the access of those countries to INTERPOL's data and information systems.

(e) REPORT ON INTERPOL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and biannually thereafter for a period of 4 years, the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant United States Government departments or agencies, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing an assessment of how INTERPOL member countries abuse INTERPOL Red Notices, Diffusions, and other INTERPOL communications for political motives and other unlawful purposes within the past three years.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) A list of countries that the Attorney General and the Secretary determine have repeatedly abused and misused the red notice and red diffusion mechanisms for political purposes.

(B) A description of the most common tactics employed by member countries in conducting such abuse, including the crimes most commonly alleged and the INTERPOL communications most commonly exploited.

(C) An assessment of the adequacy of INTERPOL mechanisms for challenging abusive requests, including the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF), an assessment of the CCF's March 2017 Operating Rules, and any shortcoming the United States believes should be addressed.

(D) A description of how INTERPOL's General Secretariat identifies requests for red notice or red diffusions that are politically motivated or are otherwise in violation of INTERPOL's rules and how INTERPOL reviews and addresses cases in which a member country has abused or misused the red notice and red diffusion mechanisms for overtly political purposes.

(E) A description of any incidents in which the Department of Justice assesses that United States courts and executive departments or agencies have relied on INTERPOL communications in contravention of existing law or policy to seek the detention of individuals or render judgments concerning their immigration status or requests for asylum, with holding of removal, or convention against torture claims and any measures the Department of Justice or other executive departments or agencies took in response to these incidents.

(F) A description of how the United States monitors and responds to likely instances of abuse of INTERPOL communications by member countries that could affect the interests of the United States, including citizens and nationals of the United States, employees of the United States Government, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, aliens who are lawfully present in the United States, or aliens with pending asylum, withholding of removal, or convention against torture claims, though they may be unlawfully present in the United States.

(G) A description of what actions the United States takes in response to credible information it receives concerning likely abuse of INTERPOL communications targeting employees of the United States Government for activities they undertook in an official capacity.

(H) A description of United States advocacy for reform and good governance within INTERPOL.

(I) A strategy for improving interagency coordination to identify and address instances of INTERPOL abuse that affect the interests of the United States, including international respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, citizens and nationals of the United States, employees of the United States Government, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, aliens who are lawfully